artificial order." 4 Examples are an order of battle (the deployment of troops or fighting ships), a building, and, most significant here, statute law. To Hayek these two types of human institutions implied different explanatory principles. If one wants to understand a made order, it truly does make sense to inquire into the design of the maker. What did Napoleon imagine when he deployed his Zouaves at the Battle of Waterloo? Or, what did Congress intend when it passed the Sherman Act? For grown orders, conversely, there is no designer. It would not make sense to ask, "What did the nation"s supermarkets intend by the recent increase in the price of potatoes?"
or "What did the common law courts design when they upheld naked restraints of trade?" Hayek argues that the sensible thing for grown orders is to devise a positive theory that explains the observations. The theory of evolution explains much about biological systems, just as modern price theory explains markets. Neither posits a human design. There is already the beginning of a literature that treats the common law as a grown order.
5
Placing the common law courts beyond criticism is controversial among legal scholars as well as among economists. Indeed, both groups seem equally fascinated with the project of critiquing judicial opinions. In many modern economic articles the questions are: Did the court have a sensible theory of what it was trying to accomplish, did it give sensible reasons in its opinion, did it rely on sound data, and was the court"s solution to the problem a reasonable one?
The traditional type of legal scholarship also takes this form. The largest difference is that modern economists use consumer welfare as the standard for judging the answers, whereas traditional legal scholars use mercantilist economics. This common analytical approach was developed by the Legal Realist school, which dates from the early 1920s, and the Yale Law School, and is now completely integrated into American popular culture.
6
Despite the ascendancy of Legal Realism in popular culture and traditional legal circles, there is an even older tradition-the Legal Science movement which had its heyday between 1870
and 1920, and is now thoroughly out of date. 7 For all their faults, exhaustively cataloged by generations of Realists, the old Legal Scientists saw the common law as a grown order. 4 See Hayek [1973] . 5 Leoni [1972] ; Aranson [1988] ; Liggio and Palmer [1988] ; Stigler [1968] . 6 Two good descriptions of the Legal Realist approach are Lewellyn [1931] and Cohen [1935] .
7 See White [1985] .
Unfortunately-or else they might have discovered law and economics 8 -the Legal Scientists believed that science was the discovery of timeless forms of beauty and logic that inhere in messy real-world phenomena. 9 The calculation of the length of a hypotenuse using the Pythagorean Theorem was the quintessential example of their theory of science. Quite consistently the Legal Scientists argued that a contract is accepted only when the acceptance is read by the other party, because that rule expresses the logical essence of contract. 10 Indeed, some Legal Scientists professed to see in this principle a beauty as timeless as that contained in the Pythagorean Theorem.
The crusty Legal Scientists never expected that mere judges would have an accurate idea of the true rule for which a body of cases stand. That was for scientists. Therefore, they and those still writing in the tradition still are-fascinated by the judicial opinion. Theirs is a world of critiquing the reasoning of the court and the various rules and tests contained within the court"s written opinion. They now have their own language. A rule, for instance, has "prongs."
The Legal Realists have always viewed the common law as a made order handcrafted by judges according to self-conscious designs. As the reader already knows, this view prevails in the popular culture where the political composition of the judiciary supposedly makes a big difference for how all types of cases will be decided. 8 Indeed, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., an unconventional Legal Scientist who had a modem idea of science, almost did discover law and economics. He wrote: As a step toward the ideal it seems to me that every lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics. The present divorce between the schools of political economy and law seems to me an evidence of how much progress in philosophical study still remains to be made. In the present state of political economy, indeed, we come again upon history on a larger scale, but there we are called on to consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of attaining them, and the cost. We learn that for everything we have to give up something else, and we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other advantage we lose, and to know what we are doing when we elect. Holmes [1897, 474] .
9 See Grey [1983] .
10 See Grey [1983] .
The modern positive economic theory of the common law, for which William Landes and Richard Posner deserve so much credit, also pays more attention to case results than to the logic and reasonableness of opinions. 11 In this sense, it is a throwback to Legal Science. Nonetheless, the modern economic theory of tort (personal injury law) departs from Legal Science by framing hypotheses that would never occur to someone considering logic and beauty. The idea that the law of tort seeks to maximize social wealth turns out to be highly unappealing to the current generation of judges and to many others, but nonetheless the hypothesis explains actual case results better than any other positive theory. The wealth maximization theory is probably as unappealing as quantum theory, yet both should be judged by how well they explain the phenomena relative to competing theories. Indeed, something may be learned from the attempt.
The common law cases are interesting economic puzzles. To study the common law of antitrust is to examine a grown order that is much more analogous to a market than many of the antitrust subjects that economists have hitherto examined. Modern scholars have already begun to reexamine these older cases, but not from an Austrian point of view.
12

II. THE CENTRALITY OF TRANS-MISSOURI AND ADDYSTON PIPE
Aside from the popularity of the Legal Realist approach, there may be a more substantial reason why economists have thought that the critique of judicial opinions is the most appropriate form of antitrust scholarship. In the United States for a hundred years, the most important source of antitrust law has been a federal statute-one of Hayek"s examples of a made order. The Sherman Act is nonetheless different from most statutes in that the courts have not stressed the legislative intent. One of the earliest cases concluded that the legislative history was so conflicting that it was not a good guide for judicial decisions. 13 For over a hundred years now the courts have developed a case law of the Sherman Act in much the same way as they started to develop a common law of tort eight hundred years ago. Although widely accepted theories of 11 See Landes and Posner [1987] .
12 See Hovenkamp [1985; 1988a; 1988b; .
13 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass"n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
common law evolution do not exist, 14 a good guess is that areas of doctrine become better the longer the courts work on them. In any event, this would help explain why economists have more often found efficient tort rules than Sherman Act ones. Also, the Sherman Act cases themselves seem to be improving as time passes.
15
In the same case in which the Supreme Court decided that the legislative history of the Sherman Act was not a valuable aid, the Court took an equally fateful step-indeed, more fateful if the ambiguity of the Congressional design created the opportunity to have a well-developed grown order as the nation"s antitrust policy. In the famous Trans-Missouri case a bare majority of five held that the common law cases on restraint of trade would not be precedents in Sherman Act cases. 16 As a body of common law, antitrust had an ancient history even by 1890, dating from at least the 15th century. In the sections that remain, I will argue that this choice to create a Sherman Act jurisprudence out of whole cloth, and in disregard of the legal rules that had by that time evolved, was unwise.
Simply because the courts decided to write their ideas about antitrust policy on a blank slate does not mean that economists have to follow suit. Indeed, there are good reasons to suppose that economists can achieve better results when they are more modest in their methodology. To give one example, when Ronald Coase wrote his Problem of Social Cost 17 he
proposed that in situations of high transaction costs, which include practically the entire subject matter of tort, the courts should place liability on the cheaper cost avoider. If that was the railroad, it should be liable; if the farmer, then he. Although Coase does not press this point as strongly as his main one-that the liability rule does not matter when transaction costs are low the strict liability recommendation is a significant claim of his article. In the past thirty years, through a detailed examination of common law decisions, economists have found that the courts" actual solution to the accident problem is more sophisticated than the simple strict liability rule Although that problem will not be solved here, I will outline its contours and suggest some approaches.
If there is a positive economic theory of the common law, a significant part of it will be based on the work of George Bittlingmayer, 20 See Grady [1988] . 20 Bittlingmayer, [1982; . 21 Telser [1978] .
22 Sharkey [1982] .
23 Doubts about the theory's usefulness for antitrust are expressed in Liebeler [1985] and in Wiley [1987] . Court in Trans-Missouri had rejected the idea of building the new Sherman Act doctrine based on analogies and distinctions drawn to the older common law cases. Nonetheless, Taft's opinion discarding as unsound large parts of the common law really sealed the fate of an enormous body of early judicial work that has since had practically no influence on antitrust policy. In the actual event, Taft's chosen sea has hardly been Lake Como. Perhaps the cases that Taft rejected contain the key to the conceptual problems that have afflicted Sherman Act jurisprudence from the beginning. divided England into three exclusive territories. In a very sensible decision, notwithstanding
25
III. THE CASES JUDGE TAFT REJECTED
Taft's critique, the court stressed how easy it would be for someone to enter this market in the event that the parties used their arrangement as the means to charge a monopoly price. Indeed, Baron Hullock said that since entry costs were low, if the parties attempted to restrict output, the market would soon expand production beyond the competitive level. This would punish the cartelists. 27 The court also found that the agreement would produce cost savings by ensuring that the parties did not engage in a wasteful duplication of effort. Contrary to modern interpretations of the antitrust laws, there is no a priori reason for supposing that this type of agreement would diminish consumer welfare; indeed, given the low entry costs that the court stressed, there is every reason to believe that the territorial division would improve consumer welfare. If a single manufacturer of trunks would find it efficient to create three sales territories so as to avoid duplication of effort, the matter is not changed if three manufacturers facing easy entry do the same.
28
A more troublesome part of the Wickens agreement, which the court also enforced, was that none of the parties would purchase any tea chest or chests, black or green, at a higher price than 6d., or 8d. each in Oxford. 29 This arrangement would be struck down as a monopsonistic cartel under current Sherman Act practice, and indeed it is difficult to think of an efficiency reason for it. Nevertheless, it seems equally difficult to imagine a monopolistic motive. Could the three national dealers have possessed a monopsonistic power in any local market for used tea chests? Perhaps they all handled a particular type of chest, and competition among them to purchase the best chests of this type would have dissipated the rent from an advantage in selling them that they all possessed. By analogy, if a Loew"s or a DeBeers finds it economic to regulate oversearching by its own buyers, it is certainly conceivable that buyers themselves could increase economic welfare by making their own arrangement. 30 A bid ceiling would certainly 27 B. Hullock, said, "If the brewers or distillers of London were to come to the agreement suggested, many other persons would soon be found to prevent the result anticipated; and the consequence would, perhaps, be that the public would obtain the articles they deal in at a cheaper rate. Upon the whole, then, I cannot distinguish this case from any of those cited, in which an agreement for a partial restraint of trade has been supported. " Ibid, 1206. 28 See Goldberg [1986] .
reduce search for the most exquisite and prized tea chests. If the supply of antique tea chests cannot be increased, much of the search for them in organized markets by competing buyers would be rent dissipating.
In Collins v. Locke 31 the plaintiffs, who were stevedores in Melbourne, divided up the stevedoring business by assigning each responsibility for ships entering the port consigned to various merchants. If the merchant refused to use the assigned stevedore, and instead used one of the other parties to the agreement, the stevedore who actually did the work would have pay the assigned stevedore an amount of compensation determined by arbitration. Also, if a ship entering the harbor was not consigned to any of the merchants named in the agreement, the parties agreed to take turns. The dispute arose when a ship entered the harbor consigned for one of the named merchants and then passed into the hands of undesignated merchants for the outward voyage.
The agreement seemed to provide that none of the stevedores could load the ship. The Privy
Council held that insofar as the agreement allocated the business to the various stevedore companies, it was not a restraint of trade; but it was a restraint insofar as it purported to deny all stevedores the right to load a ship controlled by an undesignated merchant.
The stevedore industry is one in which ruinous competition might be especially likely under the Bittlingmayer/Telser theory. Demand is highly uncertain depending on when ships arrive, and the output of the industry is impossible to store. Fixed costs are high. Given a sufficiently sporadic arrival of ships, much of the stevedores" cost could be paying workers to stand ready to unload ships on short notice. The price that recovered total cost would be significantly higher than variable cost. If it were to stay in business, each stevedore firm would have to understand that it would not cut price below a certain level. Doubtless, given their similar situations, the sellers must have shared this understanding with each other. Nonetheless, each buyer would also have a powerful incentive to get stevedoring done for the lowest amount possible for variable cost if it could find a stevedore willing to agree to it. Allocating particular ships to particular stevedores could have been the means of cutting off unproductive higgling in an environment in which both shipper and stevedore would otherwise have an incentive to engage in it. Output could be restricted only if the agreement failed to allocate all comers to one stevedore or another or if entry was difficult. The court"s order refused to enforce the agreement to the extent that it accomplished the former result (which may have been inadvertent), and entry cannot have been hard. Although the fixed cost of holding oneself out to serve a sporadic demand may be large relative to the variable cost of performing actual jobs, it is an expense that practically anyone can assume. Thus, unless the government or some quasi-governmental authority was restricting the entry of new stevedores, it seems unlikely that the arrangement would disserve consumers. 32 Therefore, it again seems that the common law result was more defensible than Judge Taft acknowledged. If it is procompetitive for firms implicitly to understand with each other that they will not cut price below the competitive level, it is unclear why an explicit arrangement to that effect should be unlawful. Indeed, if entry barriers are low, or the market thick, why should any horizontal arrangement be unlawful?
A third case rejected by Judge Taft as a basis for the new Sherman Act doctrine was
Ontario Salt Co. v. Merchants Salt Co. 33 The plaintiff and the defendant were two salt producers that had agreed to organize a common selling agency. The court approved the agreement and stressed that there were other salt producers in the same province that were not part of the agreement and that foreign competition was also a factor. The court also stressed that the selling agent could not restrict output because of the outside competition and also because its obligation was to sell the salt that the association members provided. Unlike in a modern agricultural marketing order, the agent apparently did not have the ability to destroy "surplus" salt or to allocate it to lower valued uses, as is the objective of federal milk orders, for instance. The bad light in which the Appalachian Coals case 34 now stands might make some lawyers and economists doubt that the Ontario Salt case was an ancillary restraint. Indeed, Judge Taft rejected that possibility. Nonetheless, if other salt producers were selling in the same area, a more reasonable explanation of the arrangement would be that it avoided duplication of effort.
Since salt is such a homogeneous commodity, it is hard to see the informational benefit from having two salespeople call on the same customer. Moreover, if the two agreeing salt producers 32 The Stevedores also agreed not to aid in the establishment of other stevedore companies, but for similar reasons it seems dubious that they would have monopolized the capital or other scarce resources needed to start such an enterprise.
33 18 Grant Ch. 540 (Ont. 187l).
34 Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933) . This was a similar arrangement that the Supreme Court upheld in a decision that now seems dubious to many.
truly were price takers, it would be wasteful for them independently to determine the market price at any given time.
Kellogg v. Larkin 35 was an early Wisconsin case in which the plaintiff was a miller who leased a warehouse to the defendant, who in turn covenanted to store wheat for not less than a prescribed amount, to hold himself ready to store wheat at all times, and not to store anyone else"s except at the miller"s direction. The plaintiff sued for rent, and the defendant pleaded that this arrangement was part of a broader one between the millers and warehousers of Milwaukee whereby the parties agreed to deal exclusively with each other and the millers agreed not to integrate vertically into warehousing. The court held that the covenant was lawful on its face and that nothing in it suspended the warehouser"s obligation to pay rent. Taft criticized the decision, because he thought that it really was a scheme to create a monopoly.
The Wisconsin court itself took a different view of the case. First, the court noted that the case came up on demurrer, which challenges only the sufficiency of legal papers, and said that if a jury were convinced that the covenant in practice created a monopoly, they could find for the defendants. Second, it doubted that anyone had any monopoly power. Finally, it said that the millers were in competition with eastern ones and seem to have been trying to protect themselves from the warehousers. Indeed, the court suggested that the arrangement was a vertical one seeking to regulate mutual chances for opportunistic behavior. Since the millers accounted for a large portion of the Milwaukee demand, they were collectively in a position to capture part of the value of the warehousers" specialized wheat storing assets. The warehousers on the other hand, by threatening to send their wheat east, could capture a significant portion of the value of the defendant"s specialized wheat mills. The covenant probably amounted to a regulation of these symmetrical opportunities. 36 If, as Taft believed, the arrangement was designed to create a monopoly whose rents the parties shared, why was the warehouser complaining? It seems more 35 3 Wis. Pinney"s 123 (1851). 36 The court said "The obligors possessed large facilities as warehousemen, vessel and dock owners, for storing and freighting the produce which came to that market. Their interests led them to deal in that produce in the bulk, because so it would pay the most storage and the most freight. On the other hand, to give employment to their mills, the obligees sought the same produce for manufacture. Here their interests clashed. The contract before us is the result of a compromise of those conflicting interests. And if the argument needed any such beggarly support, I think it might well be asked if the public interest were not promoted, rather than prejudiced by an arrangement which saved to the wealth of our state, the earnings from the manufacture of so large a quantity of wheat as we may reasonably suppose to have been floured in the Milwaukee mills, and which, but for this arrangement, would have been floured in the mills of some eastern state." Ibid, 145. probable that the lawsuit itself was still another opportunistic gambit in a long series. Taft noted that the common law courts tended to uphold naked restraint if the articles were not necessities, and he was critical of this rule. 43 Nonetheless, it makes more sense than he imagined. If some naked restraints might go beyond regulating what would otherwise be ruinous competition-and might not-a good rule of thumb would be to take a harder view of the cases involving commodities with inelastic demands or, in a word, necessities. By and large the circumstances that lead to ruinous competition have little to do with the elasticity of demand.
Thus, if there is the possibility that an arrangement goes beyond preventing cutthroat competition, the cost of approving the arrangement is higher for goods with inelastic demands.
To think of the opposite case of nonnecessities-fish glue and roller shades-it is cheap to approve the arrangement even if it has some tendency to create a monopoly. Any possible consumer welfare loss will be small. Consumers can easily substitute other goods. 44 The cases criticized by Judge Taft fall into three categories. They are: services, transportation, and extractive industries.
The following sections briefly review some other cases from these industries.
IV. SERVICES
A case similar to Collins v. Locke is Herriman v. Menzies 45 in which the California Supreme
Court upheld an arrangement among San Francisco stevedores that fixed prices for their services.
The court found nothing to indicate that the parties had control, or anything like the control, of 43 In Addyston, Taft wrote: "We think the cases hereafter cited show that the common law rule against restraint of trade extends to all articles of merchandise, and that the introduction of such a distinction only furnishes another opportunity for courts to give effect to the varying economical opinions of its individual members. It might be difficult to say why it was any more important to prevent restraints of trade in beer, mineral water, leather cloth, and wire cloth than of trade in curtain shades or glue. However this may be, the cases do not touch the case at bar, because the same court, in Telegraph Co. v. Crane, 160 Mass. 50, 35 N.E. 98 [1893] , held that fire-alarm telegraph instruments were articles of sufficient public necessity to render unreasonable restraints of trade in them void, and certainly such articles are not more necessary for public use than water, gas, and sewer pipe."
that business in San Francisco to an extent to enable them to exclude competition or control the price of labor or business. The court stressed that the stevedores" market share had not been proven, and it distinguished price-fixing arrangements in other industries that had been held unlawful only on larger market shares.
In Bowen v. Murdoch Matheson 46 the Massachusetts court upheld a boycott by a sailor"s union of a particular shipping company that refused its terms. Sailors, like stevedores, must hold themselves in stockpile if there is to be a reasonable availability to a shipping industry that contracts on a spot basis. Under these circumstances, without a union, the sailors could be subject to opportunistic behavior by individual shipping companies during periods of slack demand. No individual shipping company would have an incentive to pay the availability premium, even though each would benefit from the greater availability that higher wages would yield. The alternative solution to this problem would be longer-term employment contracts, but that would involve an industry structure that might then have been uneconomic for other reasons.
In any event, unless courts or law enforcement officials impede strike breakers, as they did later on, there is little risk that a union of sailors could increase the wage to a monopoly level.
V. TRANSPORTATION
In Hearn v. Griffin, 47 a case decided in 1815, the court approved an arrangement by which two coachmasters running over the same route agreed to a common schedule in which each would be allocated different days on which to run and also agreed that neither would charge more than the other. Chief Justice Ellenborough stressed that the agreement provided for maximum prices. He asked counsel, "How can you contend that it is in restraint of trade; they are left at liberty to charge what they like, though not more than each other? and by the agreement, particular days and times for each to run in the week are fixed. This is merely a convenient mode of arranging two concerns which might otherwise ruin each other." 48 The common schedule was an efficient method of coordination. Nonetheless, it also conferred a monopoly power on each, Dewey [1955] reviewed this case and correctly concluded that Ellenborough had "an uneven grasp of the theory of monopolistic competition."
The common law courts were divided in their approach to profit-pooling arrangements in transportation industries. English courts upheld many of these arrangements in the railroad industry 52 while American courts tended to strike them down. 53 The English courts stressed that unless railroads were able to pool profits over routes over which they competed, competition 49 457 U. S. 332 (1982) . would be ruinous. 54 The courts also upheld price-fixing agreements among steamship companies, 55 which also seem to be industries that can lend themselves to ruinous competition.
VI. EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
The English courts upheld horizontal arrangements in extractive industries on the ground that competition in such industries tended to be ruinous. 56 The American courts on the other hand tended to hold such arrangements to be void. 
VII. VOIDED NAKED RESTRAINTS
If there is to be a positive economic theory of antitrust, it must not only explain the restraints that the common law courts approved, but also distinguish the restraints that the common law courts voided. the shipload, a quantity that no single wholesaler could distribute itself. The Club would buy the fruit in bulk, and resell to Club members (and others) after "deducting a reasonable profit for their trouble." The plaintiff was a disgruntled buyer. The court struck down the arrangement. The arrangement is distinguishable from many upheld, because fixed costs in the fruit importing business are not high, the demand is not stochastic, and fruit-though perishable can be stored more cheaply than, say, stevedoring services. In short, there was little likelihood of ruinous competition in the absence of the defendant"s arrangement, and any efficiency consequences seemed outweighed by the potential for monopoly.
In Crawford &Murray v. Wick 60 the court struck down an arrangement by which a coal mine agreed to pressure its workers to purchase from the plaintiff"s store. The plaintiff was also the lessor of the coal mine. It seems inconceivable that this type of arrangement was necessary to avoid ruinous competition or that it produced any efficiency. More likely, it was a way of appropriating the coal miners, who probably faced lower effective wages than they expected when they moved to work at the coal mine.
In Richardson v. Buhl 61 the plaintiff sold his Richardson Match Co. to the Diamond Match Co. with the understanding that the latter would monopolize the friction match business.
The plaintiff, like others who sold out, agreed that they would not re-enter the match business.
There was a side agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants, two of the Diamond Match principals, whereby the defendants would hold the plaintiff"s Diamond Match stock as security for certain of the plaintiff"s debts. The plaintiff and the defendants were to divide net earnings on the stock. The amount of these net earnings depended on whether the amounts paid to buy off competitors were treated as expenses, as the defendants wanted and as was actually done, or as a charge against capital, as the plaintiff wanted. If these amounts were properly treated as an expense, the defendants owed the plaintiff money. The plaintiff brought a bill in equity to enjoin the defendants from selling the stock held by them as security. In refusing to enforce, the court said: "It is difficult to conceive of a monopoly which can affect a greater number of people, or one more extensive in its effect on the country than that of the Diamond Match Company. It was 60 1 Ohio St. 190 (1868) . 61 77 Mich. 632, 43 N.W. 1102 Mich. 632, 43 N.W. (1889 .
to aid that company in its purposes, and in carrying out its object that the contract in this case was made between these parties, and which we are now asked to aid in enforcing." for two reasons. First, there was no integration of production in the Ohio case. The Ohio sellers continued to sell their own salt, but at prices established by the cartel. Second, there was an obvious intent to restrict output in the Central Ohio arrangement, and the apparent ability to do
VIII. COMMON LAW EVOLUTION
The common law courts started in the early days by voiding practically every arrangement that came before them as a colorable restraint of trade. Over time they became more selective in what they regarded as unlawful. The Sherman Act courts reinvented this same history. Two theories of common law evolution are now prevalent. One is that the common law slowly conforms itself to the social and political views of the judges currently in office. 67 This can be called the Legal Realist theory of evolution; it is the one that journalists and many other contemporary observers espouse. Another theory more common in the economic literature is that the judges do not count at all. They will be guided to efficiency over time by an invisible hand. 68 Under one variant, if inefficient results are appealed more often than efficient ones, as might be true if inefficient results impose larger incentives to seek a reversal, then even a random judging process might produce efficiency. 69 Certainly the idea of a random judging process is attractive to many economists.
The Legal Realist theory predicts that the common law is efficient in proportion to the degree in which judges embrace that value. Nonetheless, it seems clear that efficiency is more widespread in case law than it is popular among judges. On the other hand, the "differential stakes" theory proves too much. It suggests that all bodies of common law will be found efficient, which is also false. For instance, the efficiency norm has nothing very obvious to say about how abortion cases should be decided.
A third theory of common law evolution is suggested by the writing of Oliver Wendell Llewellyn [1931] and Cohen [1935] .
68 Rubin [1977] .
69 Priest [1977] .
Addyston Pipe court) is under some obligation to decide the later case in the same way as the earlier one (liability). Precedent obviously creates more coherence in case law systems than would otherwise exist. Probably the case that has done most to change Sherman Act case law is Brunswick Inc. 78 (which was itself a Clayton Act case). Brunswick had purchased a number of failing bowling alleys, and its acquisitions were challenged by the smaller unacquired 77 Other Chicagoans, more consistently with the Austrian view, have stressed that courts should be agnostic about arrangements that the theory does not explain. See Easterbrook [1984; 19861. See also Arthur [1986] .
78 429 U. S. 477 (1977) .
bowling alleys operating in the same market. The plaintiff bowling alleys argued that the mergers left them as "pygmies" in a market newly dominated by a "giant." Obviously their rhetoric sought to tap into the "help small businesspeople" myth. Nevertheless, Justice Thurgood
Marshall, who never has been known for his commitment to the economist"s idea of efficiency, rejected their claim. Writing for the Court, he held that the small bowling alleys had no standing, because the injury that they suffered was not the type that the Clayton Act was designed to prevent. Paradoxically, given the authorship of the opinion, the case seems to be the end of the "help small business" myth in merger law, and I think much more generally. Perhaps the reason why the case proved so catastrophic is its facts made all too clear that protecting small businesspeople is in many antitrust contexts exactly the same as hurting consumers. In Holmes"s terms, one social desire proved stronger at the point of conflict. What are we to make of a body of knowledge whose pivotal turn was most directly accomplished by someone hostile to it? The Legal Realist theories of evolution give no account of this phenomenon and generally overstress the importance of individual judges" politics, social backgrounds, race, and the like. Under the theory of case law just outlined, one would predict that ruling myths would become fewer the longer a body of law has developed. The longer the period of time, the greater the likelihood that myth-breaking cases, like Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, will have destroyed some of the ones originally attractive to judges. Of course judges could invent new myths faster than old ones are destroyed, but it is exceedingly difficult to find a new myth that no one has thought to apply to an old legal problem. Also, the longer a body of precedent has been under development, the less the influence of any kind of undigested social myth.
In retrospect the federal courts seem to have behaved unwisely when they decided that common law precedents should not apply to Sherman Act cases. Perhaps they thought that they could find social myths more appropriate to the new industrial era than those that had been refined in the common law. Nevertheless, they could have considered the common law 79 Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1961).
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precedents in the early days of the Act without abandoning their search for new social myths. In the actual event, no new myths have been discovered.
IX. CONCLUSION
The common law courts evolved a complicated body of antitrust law about which there are no positive theories. Some of the arrangements that the common law courts upheld seem to be efficiency producing in the classic sense, though until quite recently they were not recognized as such by courts enforcing the Sherman Act, and many still have not been so recognized. For a subset of the arrangements upheld, the purpose was actually to regulate the competitive process.
In the easiest of these cases, the purpose seems to have been to regulate an opportunistic relationship. The common law courts placed much greater stress on the magnitude of entry barriers and, apparently, the elasticity of demand than have courts enforcing the Sherman Act.
This stress seems sensible because, as the common law courts said, the possibility of consumer loss-even from a naked restraint-is low when entry is easy. The same is true when demand is elastic.
